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In the original Evolutionary Minority Game, a segregation into two populations with opposing
preferences is observed under many circumstances. We show that this segregation becomes more
pronounced and more robust if the dynamics are changed slightly, such that strategies with above-
average fitness become more frequent. Similar effects occur also for a generalization of the EMG
to more than two choices, and for evolutionary dynamics of a different stochastic strategy for the
Minority Game.
I. INTRODUCTION
The Minority Game (MG) was introduced by Challet
and Zhang in 1997 [1] as a model for the competition for
limited resources. Although it has since been studied in
more than 100 publications [2], and countless variations
have been introduced, the basic scenario is still easy to
explain: there is a population of N players who, at each
time step t, have to make a decision σti ∈ {−1, 1}. Those
who are in the minority win, the others lose (to avoid am-
biguities, N is chosen to be odd). Direct communication
and contracts among players are not allowed; however,
the decision of the minority is public information, and
players can base their decision on a finite number M of
past decisions.
Global efficiency is measured by the standard deviation
of the sum of individual decision,
σ2 =
〈(
N∑
i=1
σti
)2〉
t
. (1)
Random guessing by all players leads to σ2 = N ; a
smaller value indicates good coordination among players,
a larger value is a sign of herd behavior.
One obvious feature of this game is that there is no
unique best action for the players – if it existed, it would
be the same for all players for symmetry reasons, and all
players would lose.
From the point of view of economic game theory [3],
the game has a large number of Nash equilibria – com-
binations of strategies where no player can improve his
chances of winning by unilaterally changing his strat-
egy. For example, if (N + 1)/2 players choose +1 all
the time, and (N − 1)/2 pick −1, the global loss is mini-
mal (σ2 = 1); however, those who are on the losing side
stay there forever, and a player who switches sides will
cause the majority to flip, and continue losing. Simple
combinatorics show that there are
(
N
(N−1)/2
)
such combi-
nations.
Furthermore, there are even more Nash equilibria in
mixed strategies: e.g., if all players pick +1 with a prob-
ability of 0.5 and −1 otherwise, no single player who
develops a preference for one option will have an advan-
tage from this. However, if all players continue guessing,
one gets σ2 = N , as pointed out before; a better coor-
dination would be desirable. A vast continuum of mixed
strategies exists where no outcome is preferred – all of
these are Nash equilibria.
In the absence of a unique best way to proceed, play-
ers have no choice but to adapt their strategy to their
environment, i.e., the behavior of their co-players. The
MG has become a testing ground for various forms of
“bounded rationality”, i.e., more or less simplistic deci-
sion and learning algorithms for the agents, ranging from
a choice between a small number of Boolean functions
[1, 4, 5] and simple neural networks [6] to evolutionary
algorithms [7].
This paper presents new aspects of the Evolutionary
Minority Game (EMG) studied by Johnson et al. in [7],
and introduces an evolutionary variation of the stochastic
strategy described in [8]. Two central questions are: 1.)
what are the consequences if a player who has “died” in
the evolutionary process is replaced by a modified copy
of a different player, rather than picking a strategy at
random? 2.) Can the prescription be generalized to more
than two choices – 1, . . . , Q instead of ±1, as suggested
in Ref. [9]? Let us start with a look at the original
evolutionary MG.
II. THE ORIGINAL EVOLUTIONARY MG
In its original formulation [7], the EMG works as fol-
lows: each player has access to a table which records,
for each possible combination of M consecutive minority
decisions, what the minority decision following the last
occurrence of that combination was. Players have only
two individual features, namely a score si and a proba-
bility pi. With this probability pi, they choose the action
in the history table corresponding to the current history;
otherwise they choose the opposite action.
Players who win gain a point on their score, whereas
the others lose a point. If the score of a player drops
below a certain threshold −d < 0, the player is replaced
2by a new one with a reset score si = 0 and a probability
pi that is either a modified copy of his predecessor’s value
or chosen entirely at random.
As was pointed out before [10], this scheme can be
simplified by exploiting the fact that the entries in the
history table are decoupled, and that there is complete
symmetry between the actions +1 and −1. The simplest
interpretation that gives the same stationary distribution
P (p) would therefore be that each player picks +1 with
probability pi and −1 otherwise. This points to an anal-
ogy with classical game theory [11]: the Minority Game
is an N -player negative-sum matrix game, and the pi de-
fine the mixed strategies of each player.
In the original EMG, a deceased player is replaced by
a new player whose strategy pi is a modified version of
his predecessor’s value: a random number ∆ with a given
variance V is added to the previous value, with reflecting
or cyclic boundary conditions at p = 0 and p = 1. It
turns out that neither the exact value of the threshold
d nor the number N of players play a significant role,
and that the typical size of mutations changes the re-
sults quantitatively, but not qualitatively: the stationary
probability distribution P (p) develops two peaks at p = 0
and p = 1, while there is still a significant probability for
intermediate values of p.
First attempts to calculate the probability distribu-
tion analytically were only moderately accurate [12, 13]:
they assumed that the reason for the self-organized seg-
regation was only in the self-interaction of agents, and
none of the two choices was systematically preferred. As
newer studies [14, 15] have shown, this is not true: most
of the time, there is a significant preference for one of
the two options, and players who prefer this option have
higher losses and a higher chance to be replaced. The
preference for one side undergoes rather regular oscil-
lations, with accompanying oscillations of the scores of
players with one or the other preference. (The presence of
these oscillations also means that the distribution P (p) is
time-dependent, and becomes stationary only when aver-
aged over a long time compared to the oscillation period.
Whenever we speak of a stationary distribution from now
on, we mean it in that sense.)
These publications also reported that, if a winning
player receives R < 1 points rather than 1 point, the
segregation into extreme opinions vanishes below a cer-
tain point Rc and is replaced by a preference for unde-
cided agents with p ≈ 0.5. This is a rather remarkable
result: after all, the aim of the game is unaffected by
the modified payoff R – it is still advantageous to be in
the minority, the chances of winning still only depend
on the set of {pi}, and the optimal configuration still has
(N−1)/2 players on one side and (N+1)/2 on the other.
What has changed is the dynamics of the game, and it
is these dynamics that prevent the system from finding
a more advantageous state.
The crucial point about the evolutionary dynamics
that have been considered so far is this: they do not sys-
tematically favor mutations with a higher fitness – they
are not compatible in the sense of Ref. [16]: “. . . for any
dynamic compatible with a properly defined fitness func-
tion fitter strategies should increase relative to less fit
strategies.” We will demonstrate this in the limit of in-
finitely large mutations, which amounts to the same as
choosing a new strategy completely at random. Simula-
tions indicate that the results apply to small mutations
as well.
Let us take the fitness f(p) associated with a strategy
p to be the negative of the probability of a player using
p of dying in a given round (in previous studies, this was
assumed to be the average gain divided by the threshold).
The strategies are distributed following a probability den-
sity P (p), with a cumulative probability distribution
C(p, t) =
∫ p
0
P (p′)dp′. (2)
The expected number of players with pi < p who mu-
tate in a given round is
∫ p
0
−f(p′)P (p′)dp′. Out of the
replacements for these players, a fraction of p has a strat-
egy pi < p. The updated probability function is therefore
C(p, t+ 1) = C(p, t) +
∫ p
0
f(p′)P (p′)dp′
− p
∫ 1
0
f(p′)P (p′)dp′. (3)
Going to continuous time and differentiating with respect
to p, the integro-differential equation for P (p) looks as
follows:
dP (p)
dt
= P (p)f(p)−
∫ 1
0
P (p′)f(p′)dp′ = P (p)f(p)− f¯ .
(4)
Keeping in mind that the fitness always takes negative
values, Eq. (4) means that if P (p) is small enough, it
increases even if the fitness associated with is is below
average – this is clearly not what is desired.
The problem can be remedied (in principle) by a small
change in the dynamics: a player is replaced not by a
copy of himself, but by a copy of another player. This
makes sense in various interpretations: in an economic
situation, “dying” could have the meaning of “going
broke”, and a player who tries a new start wants to imi-
tate one of his (apparently more successful) competitors.
In a biological setting, an organism literally dies, and an
offspring of another organism takes its place. With this
new mechanism, Eq. (3) takes the form
C(p, t+ 1) = C(p, t) +
∫ p
0
f(p′)P (p′)dp′ −
C(p)
∫ 1
0
f(p′)P (p′)dp′, (5)
which leads to the dynamic
P˙ (p)
P (p)
= f(p)− f¯ . (6)
3This describes a so-called Malthus process, where the fre-
quency of strategies with above-average fitness increases
exponentially. The problem with this dynamic is that
once a strategy becomes extinct, there is no way of re-
viving it. In the limit of infinitely many players that
was tacitly assumed above, this is not a problem, since
the probabilities for a strategy never go to 0 in finite
time. However, with a finite number of players imitating
each other, this would eventually lead to a small num-
ber of sub-populations, each of which exclusively plays
one of the mixed strategies that happened to survive the
initial stage (this scenario resembles a variation of the
Backgammon model [17]).
To get a well-defined final state independent of initial
conditions, it is therefore necessary to add a small muta-
tion to the copied strategy to explore unoccupied areas
in strategy space – for example by adding a Gaussian
of variance V ≪ 1 to p, with reflecting boundary condi-
tions. If this is done, a stationary probability distribution
emerges that is strongly peaked at 0 and 1 and vanishes
for intermediate p, as seen in Fig. 1. Global losses are re-
duced dramatically: for example, for V = 10−4, one gets
σ2 ≈ 0.021N instead of σ2 ≈ 0.31N for the original EMG
for large d. Coordination can be improved even more by
decreasing V , at the cost of a longer equilibration time.
Furthermore, the results of decreasing the reward R for
winning, as suggested in Ref. [14], are less dramatic:
decreasing R does not destroy segregation; however, the
peaks at extreme strategies become wider, and global ef-
ficiency decreases somewhat.
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FIG. 1: Stationary distribution P (p) of the EMG with imita-
tion, compared to the EMG without imitation with large mu-
tations. Parameters were N = 501, d = 10, R = 1, V = 10−4.
III. MULTI-CHOICE EMG
Generalizations of the MG to more than two options
were studied in [9] (with agents using neural networks)
and [18, 19] (with agents using a set of decision tables).
The basic idea is simple:
• each player now picks an action (or “room”) σti ∈
1, . . . , Q out of Q options;
• the number of players Nq who chose each option is
determined: Nq =
∑N
i δσi,q;
• the option chosen by the fewest players (the “least
crowded room”, with occupation Nmin) is declared
winner (a coin toss decides in case of a tie);
• the players who chose the winning room receive an
award (let us say, one point), whereas the others
lose 1/(Q− 1) points.
Global efficiency can be measured by taking the analog
of Eq. (1) either for the occupation of the winning room:
σ2min =
〈(
Nmin −
N
Q
)2〉
t
(7)
or the occupation of all rooms:
σ2Q =
1
Q
〈
Q∑
q
(
Nq −
N
Q
)2〉
t
. (8)
In many cases, the latter quantity differs from σ2min only
by a constant factor and is easier to calculate [9]. For the
reference case of random guessing, σ2Q takes the value of
N/Q.
The generalization of the evolutionary MG to multi-
ple choices leaves several options. We choose the one
that yields a standard multi-player matrix game: each
player is equipped with a strategy vector pi, with entries
pi,q ≥ 0 that give the probability of player i choosing
room q. These vectors obey the normalization constraint∑
q pi,q = 1.
How strongly a player specializes in one option can be
measured using the self-overlap of his strategy vector:
Oi =
∑
q
p2i,q. (9)
This quantity varies from 1/Q for a completely undecided
player to 1 for a player who chooses one option exclu-
sively. The average over the population, O =
∑
iOi/N ,
is therefore a good measure of the degree of specialization
among players.
If a player’s score drops below the threshold −d, he
is replaced by a player with a different strategy vector.
Again, two different paths suggest themselves: either, as
in Ref. [7], the player is replaced by an altered copy
of himself (or, in the extreme case of large mutations, a
4randomly chosen new player); or the gap is filled by the
mutated offspring of another, randomly chosen player.
We ran simulations starting with random initial vectors
uniformly distributed on the simplex (see the Appendix).
The same picture emerges as in the binary-choice case:
If deceased players are replaced by copies of them-
selves or players with random strategies, very little spe-
cialization occurs. The stationary distribution of Oi gets
slightly more contributions from larger values; however,
the mean value shifts only little. E.g., for Q = 3 and
d = 10, the average O changes from 1/2 for no adaption
to ≈ 0.540 for replacing deceased players with randomly
chosen strategies. Correspondingly, global efficiency in-
creases only slightly: in this case, from σ2Q = 1/3 to
≈ 0.242.
However, copying another player (with small muta-
tions) gives excellent coordination: in the stationary
state, all players specialize strongly in one of the choices
– the self-overlap of strategies is close to 1 (see Fig. 2).
The width of the probability distribution of Oi again de-
pends on the magnitude of mutations: the smaller the
mutations, the narrower the peak. As before, eliminat-
ing mutations altogether prevents coordination.
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FIG. 2: Stationary distribution P (O) of the self-overlap of
strategy vectors for Q = 3 options. The solid line give the
initial state of vectors chosen uniformly on the simplex. The
dashed and dotted line give the result of the original dynam-
ics: it matters little if replaced players undergo small muta-
tions or are chosen completely at random. The dot-dashed
line shows the effect of imitation with small mutation. The
same parameters as in Fig. 1 were used.
IV. THE STOCHASTIC MG
In Ref. [8], a strategy was presented that looks sim-
ilar to the EMG described above: again, each agent is
equipped with a probability pi that characterizes his be-
havior. The meaning of p is different, though: if a player
wins in a given round, he is content and repeats his choice
σti in the following round. If he loses, however, the agent
may rethink his game plan and switch to the opposite ac-
tion with probability pi. This prescription amounts to a
one-step Markov process which can be solved analytically
in some regimes if all players use the same p [8, 20].
For large p (of order 1), a finite fraction of the popula-
tion switches at every time step, resulting in large global
losses (σ2 = O(N2)). Furthermore, the majority flips
very frequently. The stationary probability distribution
of A =
∑
i σ
2
i takes the shape of two roughly Gaussian
peaks centered at ±Np/(2− p).e Pine finished – Clo
However, if p scales with p = 2x/N , x = O(1), there is
very good coordination (σ2 = 1+4x+4x2/3 as N →∞),
and the minority does not switch at every time step. The
stationary probability distribution is centered at A = 0,
with a width of roughly 2x.
The relative simplicity of the mathematical description
breaks down if each player is allowed to have an indi-
vidual pi: if players are distinguishable, it is no longer
enough to state how many of them are on one side or the
other to completely characterize the system. However,
with a few approximations, even then some insight can
be gained if complications like an evolutionary dynamics
are introduced.
We start with a scenario analogous to that described in
Sec. II, which we will call SEMG (stochastic evolutionary
Minority Game): each of the N players has an individual
probability pi of switching, which is initially a uniform
random number. In the case of a loss, the player loses a
point; otherwise he wins one. If his score drops below −d,
his probability is replaced, and his score reset to 0. One
would expect that players with smaller p have an advan-
tage over those with large p, and one would hope that
players organize themselves to a stationary state with
pi ∝ 1/N .
If mutations of players are performed analogous to the
original EMG (new players are modified copies of the de-
ceased ones), a stationary distribution P (p) emerges in
which small p are more likely than large ones, but there is
still a significant tail towards large p (see Fig. 3). Simula-
tions show that contrary to the original EMG, the details
of the mutation process (size of the mutation, reflecting/
cyclical boundary conditions etc.) have no impact at all
on this distribution. Neither does the threshold d. The
number of playersN has only a small effect – the shape of
the distribution for larger p does not change significantly,
but P (p) increases for very small p as N increases. This
effect is explained later; however, it is much too small to
achieve a mean p that scales with 1/N .
As mentioned before, p = O(1) means that the minor-
ity changes sides at practically every time step. Assum-
ing that this is true, it is possible to calculate the average
gain of a player with a given p, and hence his expected
lifetime. From this, the stationary distribution can be
calculated. Let us start with a more general approach,
which assumes very simple dynamics of the global deci-
50.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
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FIG. 3: Stationary distribution P (p) in the Stochastic EMG,
for different values of N . New players use randomly chosen
values of p; the threshold is d = 10.
sion and neglects the impact of a single player on that
decision. If the global minority stays the same in two
consecutive time steps with a given probability µ, the
average gain of a player can be determined as follows:
with a probability w(p), the player wins in a given round.
Consequently, he does not switch sides, and wins again
in the next round with probability µ. However, if he lost
in the first round, he can win by changing sides if the
minority stays on the same side (probability µp) or if he
insists on his opinion, and the minority switches (proba-
bility (1 − µ)(1 − p)). For a given µ, the probability of
winning is therefore
w(p) = µw(p) + (µp+ (1 − µ)(1− p))(1 − w(p)). (10)
For the average gain g(p) = 2w(p)− 1, this gives
g(p) =
−p(1− 2µ)
1 + (1− p)(1− 2µ)
. (11)
As long as g(p) is systematically negative and does not
undergo fluctuations on time scales comparable to the
lifetime of a player, it is safe to assume that the mean
lifetime L(p) is d/g(p) – the score is a random walk with
a negative drift which outweighs the diffusive motion for
sufficiently large d.
Assuming that the average p is large enough to ensure
that the majority will flip at every time step – i.e., µ = 0,
and g(p) = p/(p− 2) – one can now identify −1/L(p) =
p/d(2−p) with the fitness f(p) and use Eq. (4) to derive,
for the stationary state,
P (p) ∝
2− p
p
. (12)
This probability distribution has the unpleasant property
of diverging at p = 0, since agents with p = 0 are assigned
an infinite lifetime. In practice, three effects come into
play: first, agents never have exactly p = 0. Second, even
for agents with p = 0, their impact on the decision will
give them a very small negative average gain and a long,
but not infinitely long life. Third, µ is very small, but
never strictly equal to 0; if the probability of large values
of p becomes too small, the simplistic assumptions about
the dynamics no longer hold, and µ increases.Together,
these effects are responsible that for any given set of pa-
rameters, a stationary distribution emerges. Eq. (12)
allows for a good fit to these stationary distributions mea-
sured in simulations, as seen in Fig. 3.
The average p that emerges from these simulations is
of order 1 (to be more specific, around 0.10, with the pre-
cise value depending on N and d). This means that the
solution is self-consistent: the value of p that results from
the dynamics is large enough to justify the assumptions
that went into estimating it.
Analogous to Sec. II, the evolutionary dynamic of re-
placing a player with a random player or a copy of the old
one does not always favor strategies with higher fitness.
However, the same step can be taken to improve coordi-
nation: if deceased players are replaced with a copy of
another player chosen at random, the relative growth of
P (p) is proportional to f(p)− f¯ , just as in Eq. (6).
Unfortunately, Eq. (11) is not applicable for very small
p (since it neglects the impact of the considered agent),
and there is no simple equation that gives the fitness as
a function of the strategy for all regimes. Nevertheless,
there seems to be no situation where having a higher p
gives better results. Hence, the evolutionary dynamic
should lead to a state with minimal p for all agents. A
similar problem as in Sec. II comes into play here, al-
though it does not have quite as troubling effects: with
a finite number of players, the best possible coordination
is for all players to adapt the smallest value of p that sur-
vived the initial stage. However, this value is usually of
order 1/N – if initial values are chosen at random, they
have an average distance of 1/N .
Just as in Sec. II, the sensitivity to the initial state can
be removed by adding a small random number to pi when
a new player is created. As seen in Fig. 4, results are
similar: a peak centered at p = 0 emerges, whose width
depends on the size of the mutations. With sufficiently
small mutations, p = O(1/N) and σ2 = O(1) can easily
be achieved.
One of the drawbacks of introducing small mutations is
that their size is a new parameter that has to be adjusted
to get a σ2 of order 1. One of the conceptual flaws of the
SMG was that players had to be aware of the size of the
population to justify an adequate choice of p. One might
have hoped that in an evolutionary scheme, the correct
scaling for p would emerge naturally. With the dynamic
of copying with mutations, it does not. Maybe an evo-
lutionary mechanism that mutates the size of mutations
would solve this.
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FIG. 4: Stationary distribution P (p) in the Stochastic EMG
with copying. The variance V of mutations influences the
width of the distribution. The simulation included N = 2000
players, with a threshold d = 10.
V. MULTI-CHOICE STOCHASTIC MG
The stochastic MG can be generalized to multiple
choices in several ways, none of which is quite as nat-
ural as the generalization of the EMG in Sec. III. One
of the most intuitive ways is this: again, players have the
choice between Q different actions, or “rooms”. Those
who chose the least-crowded room are content and choose
it again, whereas all others decide, with probability pi,
to look for alternatives. If they are not informed about
which room won, they randomly pick one of the room
that they did not choose the last time. Another plau-
sible scenario is that they know which room won, and
choose it with probability p the next time.
In both cases, the system can still be considered a one-
step Markov process. However, the state of the system
must now be characterized by Q−1 values N1, . . . , NQ−1,
which give the number of players that chose each action
(the remaining value NQ can be calculated from normal-
ization constraints:
∑
qNq = N), and the joint prob-
ability distribution is a Q − 1-dimensional tensor, or a
function living in RQ−1 if one wants to go to continuous
variables. Transition probabilities look even worse, tak-
ing the form of 2(Q − 1)-dimensional tensors or integral
kernels. Put briefly, this problem is only accessible to
simulations and very crude approximations.
In the limit of p = O(1), N → ∞, the behavior is
analogous to that detailed in Sec. IV: finite fractions of
players move from room to room, and the minority op-
tion changes at every time step. Suitable variables are
nq = Nq/N , the fractions of players who chose option q.
Occupation probabilities P (nq) turn out to be a superpo-
sition of Q Gaussian peaks whose widths decrease with
N . Self-consistent values for the centers of the peaks can
be found analytically, as the following example for Q = 3
will show:
At any given step, there are three occupation num-
bers, which we order n1 < n2 < n3. Room 1 will now
receive players from rooms 2 and 3, whereas rooms 2 and
3 gain players from the respective other room and lose
players to all other rooms. Neglecting fluctuations, the
rate equations for the occupations n+i at the next time
step look like this:
n+1 = n1 + (p/2)(n2 + n3);
n+2 = n2 − pn2 + (p/2)n3;
n+3 = n3 − pn3 + (p/2)n2. (13)
If one can find a permutation of ni such that each ni is
equal to n+j with some j 6= i, one has a solution. In the
present case, the solution for Eq. (13) is n+1 = n3, n
+
2 =
n1 and n
+
3 = n2 for 0 < p ≤ 2/3, and n
+
1 = n3, n
+
2 =
n2 and n
+
3 = n1 for 2/3 ≤ p < 1. The corresponding
equations are
n1 =
4− 6p+ 3p2
3(2− p)2
for p ≤ 2/3, 1−
6
10− 3p
for p > 2/3;
n2 =
4(1− p)
3(2− p)2
for p ≤ 2/3,
2
10− 3p
for p > 2/3;
n3 =
2
3(2− p)
for p ≤ 2/3,
4
10− 3p
for p > 2/3. (14)
This solution agrees well with behavior observed in sim-
ulations, as Fig. 5 shows.
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FIG. 5: Centers of the peaks of pi(n) in the stochastic MG
with Q = 3. Simulations agree well with Eqs. (14). The inset
shows the probability distribution for p = 0.3 and N = 2000.
For small uniform p of order Q/N , analytical results
are hard to find, for the mentioned reasons. Evidence
from simulations shows that the system organizes itself
into a probability distribution close to optimal coordi-
nation. The details of the distribution depend, even for
7large N , on N mod Q. An example of such a distribution
is shown in Fig. 6.
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FIG. 6: Stationary probability distribution of occupation
numbers Nq in the multi-choice SMG, with uniform p =
1/2000 ≈ 1/N , for Q = 3.
Evolutionary dynamics can be introduced exactly anal-
ogous to the previous sections, and very similar results
are observed: choosing a new player at random and re-
placing a player by a mutated copy of himself yields
the same stationary probability distribution, which has
a long tail towards larger p. Average values for p are
around 0.2, the probability distribution of occupation
numbers Nq shows multiple peaks.
The alternative dynamic of copying another player
with mutation gives a sharp peak around p = 0, with
σ2Q on the order of 1 for sufficiently small mutations.
VI. CONCLUDING REMARKS
We have shown that the self-organized segregation ob-
served in the evolutionary Minority Game is not only
much more pronounced, but also more robust to modifi-
cations of the payoff scheme if a suitable dynamic is used
– one that allows strategies with above-average fitness to
grow, rather than keeping sub-par strategies alive. Copy-
ing another player’s strategy is a suitable way of doing
this. The copy has to be modified by a small mutation
to eliminate sensitivity to initial conditions.
We have also introduced a natural generalization of
the EMG to multiple choices, evolutionary dynamics for
the Stochastic MG, and an extension of the latter to
multiple choices. The results in all cases have striking
similarities: properly chosen evolutionary dynamics lead
to near-optimal coordination and drastic suppression of
losses, compared to random guessing.
It is somewhat ironic that the key ingredient to these
dynamics is copying the strategy of another player – in
a game where the goal is to take different actions than
the majority. One could argue that in the regime of the
EMG where players have very strong preferences for ei-
ther side, the EMG is not too different from the Stochas-
tic MG: players stick to their opinion if possible; if they
lose too often, they either copy a player from their own
side (which changes little about the situation), or they
copy a player from the other side – they switch their
output. The presence of accumulated scores makes the
situation more complicated than that, yielding preference
oscillations whose wavelength depends on the threshold.
Despite the increased efficiency and robustness that
the imitation mechanism has brought, the dynamics are
still complex, and a thorough analytical treatment has
not been found yet. The same holds for the SEMS,
where the interplay between the probability distributions
of outputs and of strategies is difficult to handle ana-
lytically. Maybe future research will fill in the missing
details.
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APPENDIX A: CONSTRUCTING UNIFORMLY
DISTRIBUTED VECTORS ON A SIMPLEX
There are many conceivable methods of finding Q-
dimensional random vectors p that obey the constraints
of probabilities, pi ≥ 0 and
∑
i pi = 1. However, the easi-
est ones do not give a uniform distribution on the simplex
of allowed vectors: for example, forcing a set of uniform
random numbers between 0 and 1 to obey the constraints
by dividing them by their sum emphasizes vectors in the
center of the simplex due to projection effects.
The following method generates uniformly distributed
probability vectors from uniformly generated random
numbers. We include it because it may be useful to the
reader for other applications.
The space of allowed vectors p is spanned by linear
combinations
p =
∑
q
aqbq (A1)
of a set of Q basis vectors bq
b1 =


1
0
0
...

 ,b2 =


−1
1
0
...

 ,b3 =


0
−1
1
...

 , . . . (A2)
8with coefficients 1 = a1 ≥ a2 ≥ · · · ≥ aQ ≥ 0. The com-
ponents must be chosen with a suitably weighted prob-
ability distribution to account for the fact that a larger
coefficient a2 allows for more combinations of a3, a4 etc.
Since the volume of the sub-simplex limited by aq is pro-
portional to aQ−qq , the appropriate distribution is
Prob(aq) =
{ Q−q+1
aq−1
aQ−qq for 0 ≤ aq ≤ aq−1
0 else
. (A3)
Consequently, a set of coefficients {a2, . . . , aQ} can be
calculated from a set of random numbers {r2, . . . , rQ}
uniformly distributed between 0 and 1 by a simple trans-
formation [21]:
a1 = 1; aq = aq−1r
1/(Q−q+1)
q . (A4)
Eq. (A1) then gives the desired vector on the simplex.
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